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Abstract
This paper addresses the recent resurgence of Nagel style reduction
in the philosophical literature. In particular, it considers the so-called
multiple realizability objection to reductionism presented most force-
fully by Sober in 1999. It is argued that this objection misses the
point of multiple realizability and that there remain serious problems
for reductionist methodologies in science.
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1 Introduction
In both contemporary physics and philosophy of science, there is a tension
between reductionist and emergentist methodologies. In high energy (or so-
called “fundamental”) physics the dominant methodology is reductionist. It
has been tremendously successful in explaining and describing various deep
features of the universe. This methodology asserts that we should search for
the basic building blocks of the universe and then, having found them, pro-
vide an account of the nonfundamental features of the world that we see at
length scales much larger (or at much lower energies) than those investigated
by particle accelerators. From this reductionist perspective, emergent phe-
nomena, if there are any, would be those that apparently are not reducible to,
or explainable in terms of, the properties and behaviors of these fundamental
building blocks. And, of course, the strong form of reductionism will deny
the existence of emergent phenomena.
The very talk of “building blocks” and fundamental particles carries with
it a particular, and widespread view of how to understand emergence in
contrast with reductionism: In particular, it strongly suggests a mereological
or part/whole conception of the distinction.1 Emergent phenomena, on this
1Without doing a literature survey, as it is well-trodden territory, one can simply note
that virtually every view of emergent properties canvassed in O’Connor’s and Wong’s
Stanford Encyclopedia article reflects some conception of a hierarchy of levels characterized
by aggregation of parts to form new wholes organized out of those parts. [15]
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conception, are properties of systems that are novel, new, unexplainable, or
unpredictable in terms of the components or parts out of which those systems
are formed. Put crudely, but suggestively, emergent phenomena reflect the
possibility that the whole can display very different behaviors than the simple
mereological sum of its parts.
While I believe that sometimes one can think of reduction in contrast
to emergence in mereological terms, in many instances the part/whole con-
ception misses what is actually most important. Often it is very difficult to
identify what are the fundamental parts. While identifying the fundamental
parts of a physical system can be a challenging task, it is often more difficult
(and more central to understanding physical behavior) to see how the prop-
erties of those parts play a role in determining the behavior of systems at
scales much larger than the length and energy scales characteristic of those
parts. In fact, what is most often crucial to the investigation of the models
and theories that characterize systems is the fact that there is an enormous
separation of scales at which one wishes to model or understand the systems’
behaviors—scale often matters, parts not so much.2
Despite the preference for a part/whole conception of reductive relations,
traditional philosophical accounts of reduction have not been expressed in
explicitly mereological terms. The next section presents the standard philo-
sophical account of reduction. This account, due originally to Nagel, has
had its ups and downs, though recently there have been a number of papers
arguing that it is the correct way to think about reduction. In section 3 I
present what many have taken to constitute the most important objection to
Nagel reduction—the problem of multiple realizability. Next, in section 3.1
I discuss an influential argument due to Elliott Sober to the effect that this
objection is misguided. I argue that Sober’s rebuttal misses what is actually
the relevant objection to reductionism from multiple realizability. Section 4
then presents a response to the problem from multiple realizability as I under-
stand it. But it is not a response that is friendly to reductionism. Finally, in
section 5 I consider another way of thinking about reductionism and discuss
a pair of examples that fit better with actual scientific practice.
2Some examples, particularly from theories of optics, where one can speak of relations
between theories and models where no part/whole relations seem to be relevant can be
found in [3].
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2 Philosophical Notions of Reduction
Philosophical ideas about the nature of reduction have their genesis in Ernest
Nagel’s 1961 book The Structure of Science [14]. He asserts that “[r]eduction
. . . is the explanation of a theory or a set of experimental laws established in
one area of inquiry, by a theory usually though not invariably formulated for
some other domain.” [14, p. 338] It is important for what follows that reduc-
tion, on Nagel’s view, is an explanatory enterprise. (See section 3.1). The
following schema captures the core of Nagel’s understanding of intertheory
reduction:
• N: A theory T (explanatorily) reduces a theory T ′ if and only if the
laws of T ′ are derivable from the laws of T .
Many theories that are purportedly reduced to others by Nagelian reduc-
tion contain terms (predicates) that are absent in the reducing theory. For
example, a paradigmatic example of intertheory reduction in physics is the
reduction of (parts of) thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. In Nagel’s
book he discusses the reduction of the ideal gas law PV = nRT to statistical
mechanics. Note in particular, that the predicate temperature, T , does not
appear in the reducing theory of statistical mechanics. Reductions of this
sort are called, by Nagel, “heterogeneous.” They pose a problem for Schema
N because straightforward logical derivation (of the type Nagel envisioned)
of any law statement containing a predicate that appears nowhere in the re-
ducing theory will be impossible. “[I]f the laws of the secondary science [the
reduced theory] contain terms that do not occur in the theoretical assump-
tions of the primary discipline [the reducing theory] . . . , the logical derivation
of the former from the latter is prima facie impossible.” [14, p. 352]
In order to perform the requisite derivation one needs so-called “bridge
laws” that connect the predicate in the reduced theory (e.g., temperature)
with some predicate in the reducing theory (e.g., mean molecular kinetic en-
ergy). In fact, Nagel proposed two necessary formal conditions for reduction:
• Connectability. “Assumptions of some kind must be introduced which
postulate suitable relations between whatever is signified by ‘A’ [a term
in the reduced theory’s (T ′) vocabulary] and traits represented by the-
oretical terms already present in the primary [reducing] theory.”
• Derivability. “With the help of these additional assumptions, all the
laws of the secondary science, including those containing the term ‘A,’
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must be derivable from the theoretical premises and their associated
coordinating definitions in the primary discipline.” [14, pp. 353–354]
Many articles have explored and attempted to establish exactly what these
“suitable relations” or bridge laws are supposed to be like. Are they estab-
lished by linguistic convention? Are they factual discoveries? Are they to be
identities? Etc.
Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that despite many years
in apparent disrepute, the Nagel account of reduction is largely correct and
should, therefore, be resurrected. I am referring to articles by Butterfield
[8, 7, 9], by Dizadji-Bahmani, et al., [10], and by Schaffner [18]. These au-
thors endorse Elliott Sober’s [19] dismissal of what to some seemed to be
a devastating objection to Nagelian reduction—the objection from multiple
realizability. [19] This argument has its genesis in work by Putnam [17]
but received its most influential formulation in Fodor’s “Special Sciences”
paper. [11] Butterfield holds that Sober has “definitively refuted [the multi-
ple realizability argument against reductionism] . . . without needing to make
contentious assumptions about topics like explanation, natural kind and law
of nature.” [7, p. 942] Once we examine Sober’s argument in the next sec-
tion, we will see reasons to question Butterfield’s claim. Specifically, Sober
makes some quite strong and contentious claims about explanation.
In the following sections I will the outline the multiple realizability argu-
ment against Nagelian reduction consider and and I will critically examine
Sober’s response. One aim is to show that these arguments are not per-
suasive. Another will be to offer some positive remarks about the kind of
reductionist methodology upon which philosophers ought to be focused.
3 Multiple Realizability
In the paper “Special Sciences, or the Disunity of Sciences as a Working
Hypothesis” [11] Fodor argues that the possibility of multiple realizability
of special science properties is a major component in an argument to the
effect that the special science cannot be reduced to some lower-level, more
fundamental science—ultimately to physics. Multiple realizability of a given
property means that that property is realized by or implemented in a wide
variety of lower-level heterogeneous physical states or properties.
As an example, consider a paradigm case (originally introduced by Put-
nam [16] and employed by Kim [13]) of the purported multiple realizability
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of the mineral jade. Jade, supposedly has two distinct physical realizers:
jadeite and nephrite that are distinct chemical kinds. In the kind of toy
“theory” that typically features in these arguments, the question is whether
one can reduce a theory of Jade containing a “law”—all jade is green—to a
lower-level theory that recognizes jadeite and nephrite as distinct chemical
realizers. To do so on a Nagelian conception of reduction, will require the
satisfaction of the Connectability requirement where the upper level predi-
cate “jade” will be related to “traits represented by theoretical terms already
present in the primary [chemical theory that concerns the properties jadeite
and nephrite and their differences].” [14, p. 353]
An obvious connection (if, in fact, jadeite and nephrite are the sole real-
izers of jade) is provided by the following bridge law:
1. (∀x)(x is jade↔ (x is jadeite ∨ x is nephrite))
But Fodor argues that the disjunction of jadeite and nephrite is too hetero-
geneous to be a natural kind of the lower-level chemical/mineral theory. Kim
strengthens this intuition by arguing that the natural kinds are individuated
by their causal powers and that causal powers of upper level properties just
are the causal powers of their realizers:
• Principle of Causal Individuation of Kinds : Kinds in science are indi-
viduated on the basis of causal powers; that is, objects and events fall
under a kind, or share a property insofar as they have similar causal
powers. [13, p. 17]
• Causal Inheritance Principle: If an upper level property is realized in
a system on an occasion in virtue of a “physical realization base P ,”
then the causal powers of that upper level property are identical with
the causal powers of P . [13, p. 18]
If one accepts these principles as applying to the case of jadeite and
nephrite, then the argument against reduction proceeds as follows: If kinds
are individuated on the basis of causal powers, and if the causal powers of
the distinct realizers for the upper level property, jade, are radically dis-
tinct/heterogeneous, then the realizations of jade on distinct occasions will
be realizations of distinct kinds. Appealing to disjunctive properties as kinds
in (3), for example, is just beside the point. There is no bridge-law that can
respect the differing nature of the heterogeneous realizers. On Kim’s view, in
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fact, this argument can be used to show that the upper level generalization—
all jade is green—isn’t a law at all and there is no special science for jade.
Or, if we insist that there is a special science for jade, it is not autonomous
from the lower-level chemical/mineral theory of jadeite and nephrite.
I do not want to go into the details of the enormous debate about the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of these arguments. Instead, since Butterfield and
others endorse Sober’s argument to the effect that multiple realizability does
not threaten reduction, I will briefly examine Sober’s discussion.
3.1 Sober on Reduction and Multiple Realizability
In “The Multiple Realizability Argument Against Reductionism” [19], Sober
adopts a Nagel-like position about reductionism. I say “Nagel-like” because
he doesn’t explicitly endorse Nagel’s view but he does endorse the Nagelian
idea (quoted earlier) that reduction involves explanation. According to Sober
there are two claims that form “at least part of what reductionism asserts:
i. Every singular occurrence that a higher-level science can explain also
can be explained by a lower-level science.
ii. Every law in a higher-level science can be explained by laws in a lower-
level science.” [19, p. 543]
He follows these claims with the following rider:
The “can” in these claims is supposed to mean “can in principle,”
not “can in practice.” Science is not now complete; there is a lot
that the physics of the present fails to tell us about societies,
minds, and living things. However, a completed physics would
not this be limited, or so reductionism asserts . . . . [19, p. 543]
I will have more to say about the use of “in principle” claims below.
Sober considers Putnam’s famous peg and board example to assess the
plausibility of (i) and (ii). We are asked to consider a board containing two
holes, one square of side length 1cm, the other round of diameter 1cm. Next
note that a square peg of side length .9cm will fit through the square whole
but not the round, circular hole. Why? Putnam claims that the macroscopic
geometric properties of the peg and board system explain this fact and that
an appeal to the microstructure (atomic/molecular) of the board and peg will
not explain this fact. (A long detailed quantum mechanical description of
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the board and peg seems completely unnecessary to explain the macroscopic
behavior of this system.) If he’s right about this and (i) and (ii) characterize
relevant features of reductionism, then reductionism will fail.
Sober counters that intuitions can pull one in different directions and that
Putnam’s claim about the explanatory priority of the macroscopic regularity
is illusory.
Perhaps the micro-details do not interest Putnam, but they may
interest others, and for perfectly legitimate reasons. Explanations
come with different levels of detail. When someone tells you more
than you want to hear, this does not mean that what is said fails
to be an explanation. There is a difference between explaining
too much and not explaining at all. [19, p. 547]
Sober asks us to consider two peg-and-board systems. For the sake of
argument, let us assume that the first board and peg are made of a ferrous
material, like iron; and that the second system is made of some non-ferrous
material, such as aluminum. (These difference might very well effect the be-
havior of the peg as it goes through the square holes as there may be magnetic
effects in the iron peg-and-board system absent in the aluminum system.) If
we adopt Putnam’s macro explanation, then we will have the same expla-
nation for the pegs’ behavior in the two cases. This has the advantage of
providing a “unified” explanation of the different systems behaviors. On the
other hand, if we opt for a micro-explanation, then, since the pegs and boards
are different, the micro details and hence the micro explanations will likewise
be different. In such a case we will have a less unified or a “disunified” ex-
planation. [19, pp. 550-551] Is the choice between providing a unified vs. a
disunified explanation of the pegs’ behavior an objective choice between two
genuinely competing explanations? Sober says “no.”
. . . I am claiming that there is no objective reason to prefer the
unified over the disunified explanation. Science has room for both
lumpers and splitters. Some people may not be interested in
hearing that the two systems are in fact different; the fact that
they have the same macro-properties may be all they wish to
learn. But this does not show that discerning differences is less
explanatory. Indeed, many scientists would find it more illumi-
nating to be shown how the same effect is reached by different
causal pathways. [19, p. 551]
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We see that Sober again counters by claiming that the choice between the
unifying and disunifying explanation is a pragmatic choice.
However, I think that his response here reflects a confusion about exactly
what is to be explained. Sober is concerned with the question of whether every
singular occurrence and every law of a higher-level science can be reductively
explained by appeal to fundamental physics. But there is another question
we can ask, and I think it provides the real challenge to reductionism from
the existence of multiply realized higher-scale patterns. The challenge of
multiple realizability with respect to explanatory reduction is to provide an
answer to the following question:
• (MR) How can systems that are heterogeneous at some (typically)
micro-scale exhibit the same pattern of behavior at the macro-scale?
Now we can ask the following: Do the “disunified” explanations actually
provide an answer to this question? For that matter, does the “unified”
explanation actually provide an answer to this question? I contend that
neither do. And so, Sober and those who endorse his argument, have really
missed the crucial challenge to reductionism.
Consider the two micro-explanations of the pegs’ behavior relative to the
boards’. The first peg, call it “A” needs to be described in all of its quantum
mechanical glory. Since we are considering explanations to be “in principle”
explanations, we can assume at this point that such a description can indeed
be provided. Next, A’s state description serves as input or initial data in
the appropriate dynamical equation (the Schro¨dinger equation) from which
we are to imagine we can derive its trajectory through the square hole in
the first board. Similarly, a different state description of the second peg,
“B,” serves as initial data for determining the behavior of B’s trajectory
through the square hole in the second board. Of course, we are going to need
extreme micro-descriptions (quantum descriptions) of the two boards as well.
Given the differences in materials (iron vs. aluminum), these descriptions
will, likewise, be very dissimilar—the macro behavior of the two systems is
multiply realized by heterogeneous realizers.
These distinct derivations are completely disjoint. The derivation of A’s
behavior tells us nothing about the behavior of B, and vice versa. In what
sense have we provided an explanation for the common macro-scale behavior
of these two peg-and-board systems by performing these in principle deriva-
tions? Recall the problem is to answer (MR). I suggest that the only way
to answer this is to provide an account of why the details that genuinely
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distinguish these systems from one another (details that tell us that the mi-
crostructure of iron and aluminum are genuinely distinct), are irrelevant for
the macroscopic behavior of interest. Neither of these derivations provide
such an account.
Does the upper level unified explanation provide an answer to our ques-
tion? Here too I think that the answer is “no.” The appeal to geometric
properties does explain why peg A can proceed through the square hole and
not through the round hole. Similarly, for the behavior of peg B. Does
this explain how multiple realizability is possible according to the theory that
distinguishes the realizers? No. Rather, it describes the behavior to be ex-
plained in non-fundamental terms. It appeals to the fact that the diagonal
of the peg is greater than the diameter of the round hole. If we are interested
in why pegs and boards exhibit this exclusionary behavior despite the fact
that they have different microstructures, we don’t have an answer. Compare
this with an account of why a particular mineral is green: It is jade and all
jade is green. But if we are interested in why jade’s greenness is realized by
the distinct mineral/chemical structures of jadeite and nephrite, this doesn’t
provide an answer.
The challenge of multiple realizability to explanatory reductionism prop-
erly understood, concerns the ability of the theory of the heterogeneous micro-
realizers to explain the common behavior displayed by the systems at macro-
scales. But as we have seen, “disunified” explanations, while certainly telling
us a lot about the behavior of individual systems, do not explain the common
behavior. And, this is true even if we buy into the idea that someday we will
have a completed physics.
Sober’s take home message is that reductionists should
build on the bare proposition that physics in principle can explain
any singular occurrence that a higher-level science is able to ex-
plain. The level of detail in such physical explanations may be
more than many would want to hear, but a genuine explanation
is provided nonetheless, and it has a property that the multiple
realizability argument has overlooked. For reductionists, the in-
teresting feature of physical explanations of social, psychological,
and biological phenomena is that they use the same basic theoret-
ical machinery that is used to explain phenomena that are nonso-
cial, nonpsychological, and nonbiological. . . . The special sciences
unify by abstracting away from physical details; reductionism as-
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serts that physics unifies because everything can be explained,
and explained completely, by adverting to physical details. [19,
p. 561]
Note that throughout his argument, Sober assumes that reduction is explana-
tory reduction—an assumption Butterfield denies, holding instead that it is
just “definitional extension.” He also assumes that having an explanation
is an in principle claim about a completed ideal physics. Both of these as-
sumptions are, contrary to Butterfield’s assertion, quite contentious. Sober’s
argument simply doesn’t apply to a view of reduction that doesn’t aim at
explanation. After all, his very definition of reduction expressed above in
(i) and (ii) refers to an explanatory project. Finally, whether it even makes
sense to talk of an ideal complete physics is a matter of contention.
For the sake of argument, let us grant momentarily that physics “in prin-
ciple can explain any singular occurrence that a higher level theory is able
to explain.” I have been arguing that this is actually not relevant to the
real problem posed by the multiple realizability of the higher level science.
One can grant that the singular occurrence of peg A’s passing through the
square hole may in principle be explained by physics while denying that that
explanation (or even that explanation in conjunction with the explanation
of B’s behavior) explains how the different realizers can exhibit the same
macro-scale behavior.
We need to distinguish between two types of explanatory why-questions:
I. Why does an individual system display an instance of macro-scale pat-
tern?
II. Why, in general, are such macro-scale pattern to be expected or even
possible? [3, pp. 23-25]
The challenge of multiple realizability, expressed by (MR), demands that the
second question be answered. But the proposition that physics can explain
any given instance or “singular occurrence” asserts only that questions of type
(I) can be answered and does not in any way guarantee that questions of type
(II) are answered by the same derivations that answer type (I) questions.
At a minimum, I believe this shows that a very different kind of expla-
nation is required to answer type (II) questions. Further, as Sober does not
recognize the difference, this opens up the possibility that one can have an
explanation of how multiple realizability is possible without having a Nagel
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type intertheoretic reduction. In order to establish this, I will need to briefly
present an argument scheme that does answer type (II) questions and ar-
gue that it really is quite distinct from the kinds of explanatory derivations
envisioned by Sober and the new Nagelian reductionists mentioned earlier.
4 Explaining Multiple Realizability or Uni-
versality
As noted, a response to question (MR) requires demonstrating that the
micro details that genuinely distinguish the heterogeneous realizers of some
macro-scale pattern of behavior are irrelevant for that behavior’s occurrence.
In several places I’ve argued that such a demonstration is explanatory and
has a character quite distinct from standard deductive-nomological strategies
favored by philosophical reductionists of Nagelian stripe. [3, 1, 2, 5] The
paradigm example of such an explanatory demonstration is provided by the
renormalization group explanation of universal behavior in condensed matter
physics.
Physicists use the terms “universality” and “universal behavior” to refer
to identical behavior displayed by different systems. In [2, 3] I’ve argued
that one should think of this notion of universality as being the same as
the philosophers’ conception of multiple realizability—different systems with
very different micro details exhibiting the same macroscopic behavior. Thus,
if renormalization group arguments can explain universality, then they can
provide explanations of how multiple realizability is possible. In other words,
we should look to these arguments as providing at least one way to answer
question (MR).
Just to make things a little more concrete, consider figure 1 from a famous
paper by Guggenheim 1945. This figure plots the temperature vs. density
of eight different fluids in reduced (dimensionless) coordinates. Values on
the x-axis below 1.0 represent the density of vapor phase of the fluids the
values above 1.0 represent the density of the liquid phases of the fluids.
Thus at 1.0 the densities of the different phases are the same. The y-axis
plots the critical temperature of the fluids where the value 1.0 means that
a system’s temperature is the critical temperature. The curve is called a
coexistence curve and it provides the various densities of liquid and vapor
phases at different temperatures. The remarkable thing about this plot is
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Figure 1: Universality of Critical Phenomena [12]
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the fact that it shows the shape of the coexistence curve to be the same for
each fluid at its critical value for density and temperature: Every different
fluid represented has a different molecular make-up. For example, Neon,
Ne, and methane, CH4 have very different microstructures. As a result of
these different microstructures the actual critical temperatures and critical
densities of each fluid will be different. Nevertheless, the fact that when one
plots the behaviors of these different systems in reduced coordinates, one
can see that each system exhibits identical behavior near their respective
critical points—the shape of the curve is identical for each system. This is
a paradigm example of universality/multiple realizability. Each molecularly
distinct system exhibits the same macro behavior represented by the fact that
the data for each system all lie on the same curve. How is this remarkable
multiply realized pattern possible?
Again, if we provided a detailed derivation from the quantum mechanical
state for a particular neon fluid we might be able to show that the coexistence
curve for neon has this shape. But that derivation will be different from one
that would demonstrate that a particular methane fluid also realizes the same
shaped coexistence curve. The “disunified” explanations will not answer the
relevant question of the form (MR).
It wasn’t until the 1970’s that there was a satisfactory answer to how
this universality is possible. That answer came out of work by Leo Kadanoff,
Michael Fisher, and Ken Wilson. Wilson won the Nobel prize for final-
izing the technique that enables one to demonstrate that the (molecular)
details that genuinely distinguish the different fluids from one another (that
genuinely allow us to see, for example, that each has a different critical
temperature and critical density) are irrelevant for the common macro-scale
behavior of interest (that they all have coexistence curves of the same shape).
This mathematical argument is called the renormalization group explanation
of the universality of critical phenomena.
Let me very briefly and non-technically outline the explanatory strategy.
One constructs an enormous abstract space each point of which might rep-
resent a real fluid, a possible fluid, a solid, etc. Next one induces on this
space a transformation that has the effect, essentially, of eliminating degrees
of freedom by some kind of averaging rule. The idea exploits the fact that
near the critical point systems exhibit the property of self-similarity. This
allows one to the degrees of freedom in the or original system with the av-
erages. One then rescales the system in an appropriate way that takes the
original system to a new (possibly nonactual) system/model in the space of
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Figure 2: Fixed Point in Abstract Space and Universality Class
systems that exhibits macro-scale behavior similar to the system one started
with. This provides a (renormalization group) transformation on all systems
in the abstract space. By repeatedly performing this operation, one elimi-
nates more and more detail that is irrelevant for that macro behavior. Next,
one examines the topology of the induced transformation on the abstract
space and searches for fixed points of the transformation. (If τ represents
the transformation and p∗ is a fixed point we will have τ(p∗) = p∗.) Those
systems/models (points in the space) that flow to the same fixed point are in
the same universality class—the universality class is delimited—and they will
exhibit the same macro-behavior.3 That macro-behavior can be determined
by an analysis of the transformation in the neighborhood of the fixed point.
In figure 2, the lower collection represents systems in the universality class
delimited by the fact that these systems/models flowed to the same fixed
point, p∗, under the appropriate (renormalization group) transformation τ
in the upper abstract space. Note that another system/model, F+ fails to
flow to the fixed point p∗ and so that system/model is not in the universality
3To put this another way: The universality class is the basin of attraction of the fixed
point.
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class.
The argument just sketched, by which one can delimit the class of hetero-
geneous systems all exhibiting the same macro-behavior, is not remotely like
the kind of derivation from initial data and fundamental equation of the kind
Sober sees in the disunified explanations he discusses. In fact, it is difficult
to consider this story in all of its mathematical complexity as a derivation
of the kind Nagelian’s appear to demand for reductive explanation. Never-
theless, it is an explanation of how the universal/multiply realized common
macro-behavior is possible from the point of view of a theory that genuinely
distinguishes the realizers from one another.
Note that we have neither explained a single occurrence of a higher-level
property nor a higher-level law. We have provided, instead and answer to
the question (MR). Sober’s way of framing the problem simply misses this
difference.
I contend that this kind of strategy can provide an explanation for univer-
sal/multiply realized behavior without satisfying the criterion of derivability
that is essential for Nagelian reduction. This means that, pace Sober, when
properly understood, the argument from multiple realizability—answering
question (MR)—does pose a serious challenge to Nagelian reductionism.
5 Another Look at Reductionism
As we have seen, Schema N treats the reduction of one theory to another
as a matter of derivation in which the reduced theory’s laws are derived
from the laws of the reducing. Typical examples are the reduction of parts of
thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, the reduction of classical mechanics
to quantum mechanics, etc. It is typical that the older, less encompassing
or coarser, and perhaps less fundamental theory is said to reduce to the
newer, more encompassing or finer, and perhaps more fundamental theory.
In the physics literature, however, one often finds claims of reduction going in
the other direction. It is sometimes said that Statistical mechanics reduces
to thermodynamics in the limit in which the number of particles goes to
infinity. Similarly, physicists tend to assert that quantum mechanics reduces
to classical mechanics in the limit in which Planck’s constant can be said to
be small. In general, the idea is that the finer theory (Tf ) reduces to the
coarser one (Tc) as the limit of some parameter,  appearing in that finer
theory approaches some value (typically 0 or ∞):
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lim
→0
Tf = Tc.
I have argued that in many instances, pairs of physical theories are best
investigated by paying attention to the nature of the limiting behavior be-
tween them. [3, p. 78–80] One reason for this is that there can be different
kinds of limiting relations. Sometimes there are smooth or regular relations
between equations of different theories. But most of the time, the limits
are singular. A limit is singular as opposed to regular if the behavior of
the equation as the limit is being approached (no matter how small  is,
though greater than zero) is qualitatively distinct from the behavior when 
is identically equal to zero. These qualitative differences are often indicative
of interesting and novel behavior.
Rather than rehearsing arguments about theories (or relations between
equations in different theories) I’ve already given, I want to present an ex-
ample where one needs to consider relations between behaviors displayed by
a given system at different scales. I will argue that these behaviors require
different explanations and that they cannot be related to one another in a
way that privileges the lower-scale, “more fundamental” level of explanation.
As such, I think this example—and myriads of others like it—pose a serious
challenge to bottom-up reductionist methodologies.
Consider a violin string of length L. See figure 3.4 Suppose we are in-
terested in determining the harmonic behavior of the string. In order to
determine the harmonic modes5 one needs to solve the wave equation—a
hyperbolic partial differential equation. In order to solve it one needs to
impose so-called boundary conditions. To derive the harmonics exhibited
in figure 3 the boundary conditions demand that the two ends of the string
remain fixed. Strictly speaking we require that they be zero dimensional
or point boundaries. That is to say, they don’t wiggle at all as time pro-
gresses. Physically these mathematical boundary conditions correspond to
the string’s not moving at the bridge of the violin and at the nut. Without
these strict conditions, one cannot derive the harmonic structure.
4Thanks to Julia Bursten for the figure and for discussions about this example.
5These are the overtones associated with the fundamental vibrational length of the
string. Tone-based musical instruments have harmonic modes for each fundamental pitch
or chord, and like varying volumes of members of a choir, the relative strength of the
harmonic overtones determines the particular timbre and character of an instrument’s
sound.
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Figure 3: Harmonic Series for an A-String
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On the other hand, if the string is really fixed and immovable at the two
ends, then, physically, we would not be able to hear the violin! After all, the
sound box of the violin amplifies the sound. But if the string is genuinely
fixed and rigid at the endpoints, there will be no transfer of energy to the
violin’s sound box and no sound will come out of it.
If we want to be able to explain and understand how we hear the violin
when it is played, we need to model the actual interaction between the string
at the bridge and nut. But this involves completely shifting scales and re-
quires that we engage in molecular modeling of the interactions at the strings
endpoints. Of course, if we do this, we lose the boundary condition required
for our continuum explanation of the harmonic structure.
To explain the harmonic structure we must suppress the detailed lower
scale physics by crushing all of that detail to a mathematical point. Mark
Wilson calls this suppression of details “physics avoidance.” [20, pp. 184–
192]
Physics avoidance might seem required on purely practical or pragmatic
grounds. One might claim: “In principle, we can explain the harmonic struc-
ture of the violin string by appeal only to lower scale atomic and molecular
details.” In fact, this is exactly the kind of strategy reductionists always in-
sist is possible. We’ve seen that Sober, too, thinks it makes sense to appeal
to “in principle” derivations from an ideal completed physical theory. [19, p.
16] But it is hard indeed to see how one can derive continuum wave behavior
from purely atomic and molecular considerations. Appeals to the possibil-
ity of in principle derivations rarely, if ever, come with even the slightest
suggestion about how the derivations are supposed to go. At the very least
one needs to consider limiting relations between discrete models and con-
tinuum models of the kind that say “let the number of molecules/atoms be
infinite.” This, however, doesn’t involve “derivation” in the sense typically
understood by Nagelian reductionists. The latter, as we’ve noted, typically
refer to derivation from “laws” usually understood as equations of motion
(in this case molecular dynamical equations of motion.) The mathematics of
these equations are quite different in form from the continuum wave equation
that we need to solve in order to determine the harmonic structure of the
string. The claim that in principle these limiting derivations can be per-
formed without some attempt to say how that can happen is philosophically
empty.
To stress this point let me briefly consider another macro vs. micro prob-
lem that is a paradigm of cutting-edge research in the physics of materials.
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The bending behavior of a steel beam, say, is remarkably well described and
explained by a continuum equation (the Navier-Cauchy equation) that was
derived long before there was any empirical evidence for atoms. Naturally,
it makes no reference to any structure in the beam, treating it as completely
homogeneous at all scales. The only empirical input to the equation comes
in the form of various constitutive parameters such as Young’s modulus that
in effect define the material of interest. Values for Young’s modulus are de-
termined typically through table-top measurements of how much a material
extends upon being pulled and shortens upon being squeezed. These values
are clearly related somehow to the actual atomic and lower scale structures
(inhomogeneities) present in the beam. But determining the connection be-
tween these lower scale structures and the values for the constitutive param-
eters is a difficult mathematical problem knowns as “homogenization.”6
In fact, one cannot determine the values for the material/constitutive pa-
rameters (or even bounds within which the values will be found) by purely
atomic/lattice scale modeling. Structures within the beam at scales in be-
tween the micro and macro play a critical role in determining the macro/con-
inuum behavior.7 To bridge the gap between models at the scale of atoms and
models at the scale of meters requires information being passed both upward
(as reductionists demand) and downward (as emergentists typically demand).
The mathematics of homogenization plays a crucial role in these interactions
between models at various scales. Here is a passage from a primer on contin-
uum micromechanics that supports this (philosophically) nonstandard point
of view.
The “bridging of length scales”, which constitutes the central is-
sue of continuum micromechanics, involves two main tasks. On
the one hand, the behavior at some larger length scale (the macro-
scale) must be estimated or bounded by using information from
a smaller length scale (the microscale), i.e., homogenization or
upscaling problems must be solved. The most important ap-
plications of homogenization are materials characterization, i.e.,
simulating the overall material response under simple loading con-
ditions such as uniaxial tensile tests, and constitutive modeling,
where the responses to general loads, load paths and loading se-
6In fact, the mathematics involved is related quite intimately to the renormalization
group arguments discussed in section 4.
7For more details than I can go into here see [4].
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quences must be described. Homogenization (or coarse graining)
may be interpreted as describing the behavior of a material that
is inhomogeneous at some lower length scale in terms of a (ficti-
tious) energetically equivalent, homogeneous reference material at
some higher length scale. On the other hand, the local responses
at the smaller length scale may be deduced from the loading con-
ditions (and, where appropriate, from the load histories) on the
larger length scale. This task, which corresponds to zooming in
on the local fields in an inhomogeneous material, is referred to
as localization, downscaling or fine graining. In either case the
main inputs are the geometrical arrangement and the material
behaviors of the constituents at the microscale. [6, pp.3–4]
It is crucial here to note the role of what Bo¨hm calls “downscaling.” We need
information about the material natures of structures at small scales, but we
get this by “[inference] from the loading conditions . . . on the larger length
scale.”
Thus I think the reductionist ideal of in principle derivation of behaviors
of systems (or laws of theories) from from more “fundamental” lower scale
details (or more fundamental theories) is largely mistaken. Any examination
of the actual practice of scientists interested in modeling systems at different
scales will reveal nothing as simple as the kind of derivation that propo-
nents of Nagelian reduction believe is possible. The appeal to a completed
ideal physics—the main feature that underwrites these in principle claims—
is purely aspirational and speculative. We have no idea what such a physics
would look like, nor do we have any real evidence that it exists.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that multiply realizability, when properly under-
stood, does indeed pose a serious objection to reductionism. The objection,
properly understood, demands an answer to question:
• (MR) How can systems that are heterogeneous at some micro-scale
exhibit the same pattern of behavior at the macro-scale?
In effect, this is a request for an account of the relative autonomy of the
macro-scale pattern from the micro-scale details. After all, if the micro-scale
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details were relevant to the macro pattern, then the pattern would not persist
as we change the micro details.
I argued that many reductionists who accept Sober’s critique of the mul-
tiple realizability do so mistakenly, because he (and they) do not fully un-
derstand the challenge. I then outlined very briefly how one can, at least
in some important cases, answer question (MR). This involves mathemat-
ical techniques that do not look anything like reductionists’ conception of
derivation or deducibility. These techniques allow one to show how details
that genuinely distinguish realizers from one another are irrelevant to the
existence of the pattern.
Finally, in section 5 I discussed two examples—understanding why a violin
string exhibits particular harmonic tones and understanding how a steel beam
behaves under elastic loading—that present severe challenges to traditional
philosophical views about reduction.
The positive message to be gleaned from these examples is that one can
sometimes bridge between macro- and micro-scales. Applied mathemati-
cians, material scientists, and physicists have begun to develop means for
such multiscale modeling. Philosophers of science need to pay more attention
to the subtleties involved in these attempts. The debate between reduction-
ists and emergentists has too long been framed as an absolute, all-or-nothing
affair. In fact, multiscale modeling is a very complex enterprise. Focus-
ing on this applied work will provide us with a much better, more nuanced
understanding of the scientific method.
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